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INTERNATIONAL I N S T I T U T E  FOR APPLIED SYSTEMS ANALYSIS 
A - 2 3 6 1  L a x e n b u r g ,  A u s t r i a  
A nraj or component of I IASA' s Technology-Economy-Society 
<TES) Program is a project to assess "Computer Integrated 
Manufacturing" (CIM), by which is meant the whole range of 
application of computers to discrete parts manufacturing and 
assembly. The various familiar acronyms and buzzwords, such as 
BC, CBC, DBC, CAD/CAM robotics, FMS, "group technology" and WRP 
all fit under the broad CIH umbrella. The present paper i6 the 
first to be generated, at least in part, under the project. <In 
fact, an earlier draft was written while the author was at 
Carnegie-Mellon University). The paper presents some interesting 
and new ideas about the nature of the forces driving the 
worldwide trend toward flexible automation. It suggests, in 
brief, that the demand for CIM arises from what Nathan Rosenberg 
has termed as "mismtch", 1. e. a problem that was created, in 
effect, by technological progress itself. In this case the 
"problem" is that defects in manufacturing have become 
intolerable. The reason for that is that demand for higher and 
higher levels of product performance, over many decades, has 
required orders-of-magnitude increases in mechanical complexity, 
on the one hand, and higher precision, on the other. To satisfy 
these high standards requires a level of error control that 
increasingly precludes the use of human workers in direct contact 
with workpieces as they move through the manufacturing system. 
This working paper is being made available more widely to 
stimulate discussion and comment. We hope that it will succeed 
in that regard. 
Robert H. Pry 
Director 
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1 Background 
According to the poet Alexander Pope "to err is human; to 
forgive divine". This may be a truism in the moral sphere, but 
it is only half true in the production context. Modern 
manufacturing, in particular, is unforgiving of error. Exact 
figures are lacking, but a surprisingly large fraction of the 
cost of production is directly attributable either to the 
prevention of avoidable defects (e. g. quality control), their 
detection (e.g. inspection), or their elimination after the fact 
(repair, rework). A survey carried out by Quality (June 1977, p. 
20) over 10 U.S. manufacturing industries found that total 
quality costs (inspection, scrap, rework and warranty) averaged 
5.8% of sales. The importance of this figure is doubled when one 
considers that roughly 50% of the sales dollar goes for purchased 
materials which also include a quality cost component. From 
another perspective, the celebrated Japanese superiority over the 
U.S. in manufacturing may stem largely from a longer established 
Japanese recognition of this problem coupled with widespread 
commitment to ameliorate it. ' . In this paper I will explore five 
related hypotheses, as follows: 
- That the human "error rate" is inherently large and cannot 
be reduced to (or nearly to) zero even under the most 
'Xerox corporation offers an interesting example. Recently 
Xerox announced with some pride that its parts reject rate is now 
down to 1.3 per thousand <from 8 per thousand a few years ago). 
However, its Japanese competitors have achieved reject rates less 
than 1 per thousand <N. Y. Times, November 16, 1985). Since the 
early 70's when its exclusive patent protection expired, Xerox's 
market share of the plain paper copier market has fallen to about 
36% while Japanese companies like Ricoh and Canon totally 
dominate the low-cost segment of the market. A recent study of 
the room airconditioner industry found even more startling 
differences: Japanese firms achieved assembly line defect rates 
almost 70 times lower than U.S. firms, on the average, while 
among U.S. firms there was a best-to-wor~t range of 7 per 100 to 
165 per 100 [Garvin 19831. The best Japanese producers achieved 
failure rates between 500 and 1080 times better than the worst 
U. S. producers < i bid) . 
favorable conditions -- although clever human factors 
engineering can of ten achieve substantial improvements over 
existing rates in given cases. Severtheless, human workers 
are not improving rapidly (if at all) in terms of their 
prospensity to make mistakes on the job; 
- that "high performance in a product tends to require a high 
degree of precision and complexity in the design and 
z~anufacturing process. This tendency can be seen most 
clearly over time; 
- that as precision increases and the production system 
becomes more complex and more interrelated the cost of 
information required for controlling the manufacturing 
process as a whole has been growing geometrically. The cost 
of discovering and/or eliminating defects, in particular, 
seems to increase as a non-linear function of product 
complexity and diversity; 
- that defects can be thought of as lost information (just as 
errors in accounts or mssages) and that error-detection and 
error-correction techniques from communications theory may 
be appropriate tools for management; 
- that defects can best be eliminated in manufacturing by 
adopting the 'monolithic* concept that has been so 
successful in electronics. 
2. The Intrinsic BunanBrror Probability 
Ergonomists and human factors engineers have traditionally 
approached the "error" problem in terms of "explaining" errors by 
machine operators in terms of poorly designed man-machine 
interfaces. Their focus has been largely on redesigning this 
interface to increase system reliability. This is understandable 
and desirable but tends to obscure a key fact: that even with the 
best designed man-machine interface, the probability of human 
error cannot in practice be reduced to zero except, possibly, by 
decreasing the rate of useful output to zero also. A m n g  the 
fundamental reasons why humans are inherently error-prone is the 
inability to maintain a permanent state of concentrated 
attention. Subconscious, autonomous processes are necessary for 
the functioning of the organism. Heart and lung operation are 
only two examples. Limbs must move or twitch from time to time 
or they will cramp. Eyes must 'blink' occasionally to maintain 
external lubrication, itches must be scratched, throats must be 
cleared, etc., etc. These biophysical functions occasionally 
interfere with conscious mental activities and cause lapses in 
attention. 
Factors that tend to increase the error-rate above the 
theoretical minimum rate are known to include: 
- emotional stress 
- physical strain and discomfort 
- interference (noise ) 
- poor illumination 
- information load (overload). 
The influence of these factors on human performance and 
error rate is discussed in a number of ergonomics and human 
factors monographs and research reports such as CMeistei 711, 
[Meister 761 , and [Swain & Guttmann 831. 
The general relationship between information processed 
(input) and information transmitted (output) has been discussed 
extensively in the ergonomics and psychology literature, 
especially in the context of estimating maximum output rates. To 
summarize a great deal of ergonomic data in a few words,= the 
amount of information "lost" -- which is equivalent to the error 
rate -- rises extremely sharply as the input rate approaches 10 
bits/sec. This can be interpreted, without straining the facts, 
as a straightforward problem of information overload, or 
saturation. The overload hypothesis would seem to offer a 
partial explanation, at least, of the extremely high propensity 
of humans to make errors in emergency situations, noted by Swain 
& Guttmann [ op citl . More relevant to this paper, however, is 
the fact that there is apparently a minimum error rate for human 
workers, even under ideal conditions. 
As a matter of historical interest, the major justification 
for automatic computation from Charles Babbage's time onward, is 
the fact that mathematical tables computed by humans are 
'For a more extensive review of the background of this 
statemnt , see Ayres C 1987cl . 
notoriously full of errors (mostly of transcription). According 
to one historian of computers, speaking of Babbage's motivation: 
"Bone of these tables could be trusted, and lPany an 
experiment was undermined when the scientist discovered an 
error in a table he had relied on. One writer of the time, 
Dionysius Lardner, discovered that mistakes originally 
committed by European mathematicians in 1603 cropped up 200 
years later in Chinese manuscripts. Government tables used 
for accurate navigation had more than 1100 errors and seven 
folio pages of corrections. The corrections needed 
corrections". C Shurkin 85, p. 231 . 
The problem only got worse, as mathematical tables were needed 
for more and more purposes. In the 1930'6 the VPA tabulated many 
mathematical functions (using people with hand calculators) but 
these tables were full of errors--mostly mistakes in copying. 
The tables were later recalculated by Howard Aiken's Wark I 
Electromechanical computer, to eliminate these errors [Brooks 
861. Recent Department of Defense studies indicate an average of 
one error per 30 manual data entries. By comparison, optical 
scanners reading bar codes make one error per 3,000,000 entries 
CWcKenney & HcFarlan 82, p. 1091. Roughly speaking, electronics 
technology is now on the order of five orders of magnitude less 
error-prone than human workers. 
There is no experimental evidence, nor any theoretical 
reason to suppose that the human error probability (HEPI can ever 
be reduced to zero (or even very close to zero) in any practical 
case. Indeed, Heister himself remarks that "errors are 
inevitable unless there are no tolerance limits" Cop. cit. 1. In 
repetitive jobs involving simple decisions of the yes/no type the 
minimum human error probability (HEP) appears to be of the order 
of I@-=. In other words, the error rate generally exceeds 1 per 
1000 opp~rtunities.~ HEP may be much greater if working 
conditions are not ideal. However, I will not further explore 
the relationships between various aspects of working conditions 
and HEP, except to recall that experiments show that the error 
T h i s  number comes from a recent publication summarizing the 
literature [Swain 831. An earlier book by Swain suggested the 
range la-" - for HEP. Evidently recent evidence tends 
toward the larger figure. However, to be conservative the lower 
figures should be considered as a (remote) possibility. 
rate begins to rise rapidly as information output approaches 
about 8 bits/sec. To achieve a low HEP, other factors being 
favorable the information processing load must be kept well below 
the workers capacity -- probably well below 2-3 bits/sec. 
3. ~ c l s l o n ,  Complexity and Perforance 
Vith regard to the second hypothesis -- that high 
performance demands precision and complexity -- a few random 
examples will have to suffice to make the point, since no scholar 
(to my knowledge) has ever explored the question in depth. 
Indeed, the proposit ion becomes almost self -evident from the 
superficial examination of early machines. Invariably, they are 
quite simple and crude by comparison to their modern 
counterparts. One early weight-driven clock, for instance, 
utilized 8 gear wheels, an escape wheel, a crank (3 parts) a 
foliot balance ( 5  parts), a verge (3 parts), 6 axles, 2 pointer 
hands, a face plate, and various frame parts, pins, etc. CStrandh 
791 . Later versions introduced second-hands, adjustment 
mechanisms, self-winding mechanisms, chimes or alarms, calendars, 
jewel-bearings or ball-bearings, and so on. Surface tolerances 
for early clock parts were seldom better than 1:100, and time- 
keeping accuracy was correspondingly low. By contrast modern 
mass-produced electronic watches achieve time-keeping precision 
of the order of 1: la6 or even better. This level of performance 
obviously requires a correspondingly high order of precision in 
the manufacturing process. 
Tools provide another illustration. Early hand tools such 
as hammers, tongs, or shears typically involved 2 or 3 parts. A 
late 19th century hand-drill (brace and bit) with a chuck 
accommodating various drill bit diameters involves 20 parts. A 
push-type reversible hand-held screw-driver with an adjustable 
chuck utilizes 30 or =re parts. The addition of an electric 
drive motor would, of course, add another 50 or so. A hand-saw 
had 3-5 parts. A motor driven chain-saw of current vintage has 
several hundred parts, excluding the motor. Xoreover, each of 
these parts is made with a level of precieion in terms of 
composition and surface finish far beyond the capabilities of 
19th century manufacturers. 
Vehicles provide the clearest evidence of the trend toward 
precision combined with complexity. Horse drawn taxicabs of the 
mid-19th century consisted of a springless chassis with an 
enclosed body for the passengers, 2 doors and a simple bench for 
the driver, two iron axles, 60lid iron sleave-type bearings, four 
relatively simple spoked wheels, and tiller-type of steering 
mechanisms. The wheels were already mderately sophisticated, 
with 8-12 spokes and steel rims. The introduction of the safety 
bicycle in 1885 was a quantum leap in several areas, including . 
the lightweight whee 1, gearshift , chain-sprocket drive and 
ball-bearings. Each of these devices is highly complex. Thus an 
1885 Rover safety bicycle required more than 500 individual 
parts. 
The earliest motorized vehicles (Benz, 1886) added a small 
1-cylinder gasoline engine with a chain and sprocket drive 
mechanisms to a 3-wheeled carriage using bicycle wheels4. Benz's 
1-cylinder engine was a direct adaptation of Otto's successful 
spark-ignition gas engine (1876) for gasoline. In 1893 Xaybach 
invented the carburetor. The steering wheel replaced the tiller 
after 1901 and the steering knuckle followed in 1902. 
Differential gears were introduced to allow the rear wheels to 
turn at different speeds. 
Other features adding greater convenience, power or ability 
-- at the price of added complexity -- included the pneumatic 
tire (now very complex product in itself), springs and shock 
absorbers, multi-cylinder engines, the electric self-starter, 
acetylene headlamps followed by electric headlights, batteries, 
dashboard instruments, more controls -- such as the throttles and 
chokes -- water cooling, forced feed lubrication, mechanically 
operated valves, magneto's (later generators and alternators), 
hydraulic brakes, synchromesh transmission (1914) -- later 
followed by automatic transmission--, safety glass, power brakes, 
power steering, radio, air conditioning, emission controls, and 
60 On. 
W n e  later simplification was the introduction of pressed 
solid o~etal wheels, in place of complex bicycle type wheels. 
This became possible due to the development of n e w  metal-working 
processes. 
In fact, the modern car is a relatively complex piece of 
machinery, involving as mnny as 30,000 component parts. Of 
these, only a few percent are actually mnnufactured by auto 
companies t h e m s e l v e ~ . ~  As mnny as 30% of the total number are 
electrical or electronic, and this percent is rising rapidly. 
Xost parts have at least 3 distinct surfaces, while mnny parts 
(including threaded connectors) have 8-10 surfaces. A few parts 
like gear-wheels, pistons, crankshaft, and camshaft have a large 
number of surfaces. Thus a car probably has 60,000 to 80,800 
distinct 'oriented' surf aces. 
Yet autos are relatively simple compared to aircraft, 
helicopters, diesel-electric locomotives, transfer lines, 
electric generating plants, computers and other capital goods. A 
large steam turbine involves 350,000 parts. A Boeing 747 
includes roughly 1 million parts. The space shuttle is probably 
the apogee of mechanical complexity (with unfortunate 
consequences). It probably involves on the order of 10 million 
individual parts. See Figure 1. 
Quite apart from the large number of distinct parts in a 
complex modern product, a manufacturer today typically offers a 
large number of different models of each basic item. For 
example, Vestinghouse Electric Company manufactures over 50,800 
different steam turbine blade shapes alone. A major electrical 
connector mnnufacturer ( A m )  produces 80,000 different connector 
models. The IBW SelectricTM typewriter (with 2,700 parts) could 
be made in 55,000 different models. 
4. The Relatiomships Between Coxplexity, Errors and Defects 
It is axioz~atic among industrial engineers that 
*'product defects, failures, and accidents are invariably the 
result of human error... Since the worker is merely part of 
the production system, which has been consciously and 
deliberately designed, it stands to reason that those who 
designed the system are responsible for any inadequacies 
occurring in it." [Heister 821. 
This view, of course, puts enormous emphasis on human factors and 
systens engineering. The role of human factors engineering is 
=Virtually all of the simple parts (bearings, pistons, rings 
and fasteners) are purchased, as well as most electrical parts, 
rubber, glass and many complex subassembl i e s  1 ike brakes, 
transmission, hydraulics and emission controls. 
lo1 102 lo3 10' 105 lo6 (MSI 
(Market Dze) -
Figure 1 .  Major U.S. durable goods i n d u s t r i e s .  
Source: [Nagayama Q Funk 851 (Revised) .  
undoubtedly important and often underrated. Indeed, human error 
probability (HEPI for a given activity in a given situation can 
often be sharply reduced from current levels, at modest cost, by 
eliminating certain factors that tend to increase errors. On the 
other hand, the claim (ibid) "that errors can always be 
eliminated by better systems design" is not scientifically 
justified, except in the special case where human workers are 
eliminated. The basic reason is that the human worker himself is 
not subject to redesign. Hence any system involving human 
workers is inherently subject to human limitations. 
Of course, many errors in manufacturing are caught by 
multi-layer inspection systems. An average human-based system 
will catch and eliminate 70% - 80% of the defects per inspection. 
Vith a hierarchy of several inspection systems, the probability 
of a defect being undetected can be reduced to perhaps 2 in 100, 
giving a theoretically achievable final rate (for defects 
embodied in the product) of the order of I@-=. Of course this is 
very low as compared with defect rate of lo-" - 10-a currently. 
Bevertheless, it is not low enough as will be seen. 
Also, it must be recognized that, because of design 
redundancies and other factors, most (70% - 80%) defects don't 
matter much. For instance, spot welders in auto body plants are 
expected to make a certain number of bad welds. To compensate for 
this, designers simply provide for more welds than would 
otherwise be necessary. (Robot welders are more reliable than 
human workers and plants using robots can design for about 10% 
fewer welds). Hence the critical defect rate would be somewhat 
lower than the basic defect rate. 
All things considered it seems possible that critical 
undetected defect rates might be reduced to the order of 10-6 
<.0001) or perhaps even la-" (.000001). But these rates are 
hypothetical. They are far lower than actual current industrial 
performance. (A "good" reject rate today is around 0.1% or 1 per 
thousand). Bevertheless the costs of overdesign (or "gold- 
plating"), ' multiple layers of inspection, debugging, rework, 
"The high costs associated with overdesign are particularly 
evident in military procurement. So-call led "military 
specifications" (or mil specs) typically lead to unit costs from 
10 to 108 times greater than comparable products designed for the 
maintenance and -- above all -- the heavy costs associated with 
catastrophic parts failures that occur after a product is in 
service -- make human errors increasingly intolerable in 
manufacturing. A 5 . 8 %  direct cost percentage was cited earlier, 
but this is only the tip of the iceberg. When the burocratic 
structures and accounting procedures made necessary by the 
tendency of humans to err are also considered, the 'real' cost of 
error control in a modern manufacturing firm may be much higher. 
This problem is particularly burdensome where high levels of 
product performance are desired, requiring high degrees of 
complexity in the product design, or in mass production 
situations. 
According to Meister (op. cit. ) ,  a single large U. S. auto 
manufacturer provides about 3 billion opportunities for human 
error per day in assembly operations alone. Even in the most 
optimistic case -- assuming a probability of undetected serious 
error of 1 per million opportunities -- an autom manufacturer 
would have to expect about 3000 serious undetected production 
flaws per day, or 1 in 3 cars. The actual number of assembly 
defects in autos is almost surely much larger under present 
conditions. In fact, consumer surveys have repeatedly noted, on 
the average, several defects per car. 
The dilemma faced by manufacturers of complex products can 
perhaps be understood more clearly from a simplif led "model" of 
the production process. Suppose the final product involves 
components of N distinct part types, each which involves a 
sequence of unit operations. The total number of actual 
operations involved is, theref ore, 
civilian market. Yet military hardware i6 notoriously 
unreliable. This I6 surely attributable, in part, to the attempt 
to achieve maximum possible perforllrance which, in turn, leads to 
extraordinary complexity of design. On the other hand, military 
equipment is often made in small batches unsuited for automation, 
thus simultaneously maximizing opportunities for human error. 
where n, is the number of components of the 1'' part type and mi 
is the number of unit operations needed to produce the if.h part 
type. Each unit operation is an opportunity for error and a 
decision point where a hypothetical inspector makes a yes/no 
decision. ("Yes" means the operation was carried out correctly, 
while "no" means it was not). If the result of the inspection is 
positive -- "yes" -- the workpiece presumably moves on to the 
next operation. If the results of the inspection are negative -- 
"no" -- the workpiece is presumably rejected and discarded or 
diverted into a "rework" line of some sort. 
Suppose the a priori probability of error in the jt~-~ unit 
operation of the branch (or part type) is known to be p, ,. 
We can assume pi is a small number, of the order of I@-'-. 
Asssuming perfectly reliable inspectors17 the a priori 
probability of a "yes" at the ij*-b inspection point is (1 - pi,). 
The probability of making one flawless component of the if.+1 type, 
with no parts rejections or need for rework is, therefore, 
where u, is the probability of making the it." part successfully. 
It follows that the probability u of manufacturing the 
components flawlessly is 
For purposes of argument, suppose that there is a lower limit on 
pi j 1 viz. 
5 pi for all 1, j (4 > 
It follows immediately that 
70bviously, the real situation is much iess f k v ~ r a b l e !  
for all 1, j and, therefore, the probability achieving "zero 
defects" is bounded 
where W is defined by equation (1). 
Bow (6) can be approxi-ted in two different ,limiting cases, 
depending on the product Wn, the number of "opportunities" for an 
error times the a prior1 probability of an error per opportunity. 
If W "  > >  1 
But if Mn < <  1 
In words, if opportunity -times- probability of error 
significantly exceeds unity, the probability of achieving a 
product with "zero defects" (without many layers of inspections 
and rejections and much rework) is essentially nil. Consequently 
quality control and rework must inevitably constitute a large 
fraction of the costs of any complex product. Since inspection 
itself is subject to human error, complex systems manufactured, 
maintained and operated by humans are statistically certain to 
fail with some regularity. (The reliability problems of the U.S. 
space shuttle illustrate this point perfectly). 
The production system can be regarded as a noisy channel of 
communication where the final product (or service) is, of course, 
the "message". Errors in mnufacturing certainly constitute a 
kind of inf c8rrriiticr. ; G S S  zlr "r,o:se". Huwns are obviously the 
major source of noise in the system. The reduction or elimination 
of channel noise effectively adds useful information to the 
"message". Since the number of inspection points (error 
possibilities) is defined as M (Equation I), it follows that the 
number of possible erroneous versions of the message is 2m. 
Hence, the selection of one "correct" version requires exactly 
bits of information per unit of final production. 
Taking a clue from communications engineering, there are two 
possible strategies for increasing the signal to noise ratio and 
ensuring correct transmission of the desired message through a 
noisy channel. One strategy is to reduce the intrinsic noise 
level in the channel (e. g. by cooling it). The other is to code 
the transmission in such a way as to increase redundancy. In 
fact, it is relatively easy to design codes to automatically 
reveal (1.e. detect) certain classes of common input/output 
errors, such as transpositions. Vith slightly more 
sophistication, errors once detected can also be corrected 
automatically with a known (and fairly high) probability of 
success. 
Both of these strategies are applicable in manufacturing. 
The first (noise reduction) strategy is primarily accomplished by 
removing humans from tool-wielding and direct operational control 
over machines. Computers using solid-state electronic circuitry 
are far more reliable than humans in the sense of having an a 
prior1 probability of error per opportunity much lower than 
humans. The worldwide trend towards automation can be regarded as 
an implementation of this strategy. The second (coding) strategy 
must be accomplished through product design. "Design for 
manufacturability" is nearly a cliche. However, just as coding 
can make many types of transmission errors self-revealing, many 
types of manufacturing errors reveal themselves automatically in 
the assembly stage. Of course, this is not a very clever 
solution. It is far cleverer to find and weed out defects as 
soon as they occur in the process. Wonitoring and screening 
devices of many kinds can be devised to react automatically to 
flaws of predictable types. It is part of the system designer's 
function to design for easy error detection. 
6 Ihnagemnt I q l i c a t i o n s  and Coxplexity & Diversity 
The evident trend toward product complexity on the one hand, 
and model diversity on the other hand, also puts great stress on 
management. Just keeping track of parts inventories and 
suppliers is becoming an enormous task for large manufacturers. 
For example, Caterpillar Tractor Company does business with 
25,000 different suppliers, worldwide. This number could well be 
dwarfed by comparable figures for General Electric, IBM or 
General W ~ t o r s . ~  The problem on the product distribution side is 
equally formidable (and less we1 1 understood), because demand 
patterns can change very quickly. Manufacturers are in a 
position as difficult as that of banks, which have to obtain 
their funds from short-term depositors while making risky 
long-term commitments. Wanuf acturers of consumer products today 
must make comparatively long-term commitments to their own 
suppliers, while responding to short-term changes in their own 
markets. This puts increasing emphasis on managerial and 
manufacturing flexibility. 
Generalities aside, it is arguable that the information 
processing requirements associated with efficient manufacturing 
increase much faster than complexity/diversity per se. The 
evidence supporting this conclusion will be reviewed hereafter. 
The implications are worth stating clearly now: unaided human 
intelli~ence is increasinuly inadequate for purposes of selectinq 
optimal or near optimal - manufacturin~ strateuies, ~iven the 
enormous ranffe of choices to be made. These include: long-term 
business strategy, (what business are we in?) marketing strategy 
Ce. g. mass v. custom) ; product design strategy (performance, 
reliability, finish price); materials choice; make v. buy 
decisions for each component; supplier selection; supplier 
relationship (long-term v. short term) mfg. strategy (location, 
scale, process choice); assembly strategy; distribution strategy; 
maintenance and customer support strategy. The choices to be 
"'It was reported recently, however, that Xerox Corp. has cut 
the number of its suppliers from 5,000 to 300, in order to work 
m5re closely with each of them (New York Times, November, 1985). 
made are interdependent, as well as being functions of the state 
of technology, financial constraints (interest rates, debt v. 
equity, liquidity, current profitability, etc. ) . Hany managers 
believe that the inherent complexity of these higher level 
decisions is such that only human judgment can ultimately be 
relied on. It is arguable, however, that the complexity is 60 
great that (unaided) human judgement is almost inevitably 
inadequate. I mean that obvious or traditional choices are 
likely to turn out to be si~nificantly inferior to optimal 
choices that might (in principle) be found with enough help from 
computers and artificial intelligence (A.1.). 
It is not possible to examine each of the above-mentioned 
sub-optimization problems in any detail. In keeping with the 
primary focus of this paper, I will consider only the physical 
aspects of parts manufacturing and assembly. Figure 2 outlines 
schematically the processes of design, manufacturing and assembly 
as it might conceivably be organized in the future [DeFazio & 
Vhitney 833. The two boxes marked by asterisks represent tasks 
of considerable difficulty that are currently carried out 
manually, and probably will be for some tinte to come. Until now 
relatively little research has been done on devising systematic 
methodologies or "algorithms" for determining assembly order, and 
parts transport and feeding technologies. 
The corresponding problem for parts manufacturing strategy 
is to select parts forming processes and sequences, and to layout 
the machines on the plant floor for efficient scheduling. This 
problem has been approached more or less systematically by 
classification of parts by shape and creating a geometrical parts 
code (Figure 3). This code permits rapid computerized sorting of 
parts by shape, size, material and other characteristics and 
matching to approximate machines. It also permits grouping of 
parts based on geometrical similarities. In some cases existing 
parts can be found that preclude the need to design new ones. 
More commonly, new parts can be developed by identifying similar 
existing ones and modifying them appropriately. For 
manufacturing purposes, groups of geometrically similar parts 
correspond to machine groupings. 
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"Group technology" (or GT), as it has  con^ to be knowr1,- is 
essentially an information processing system for systematizing 
design and manufacturing choices. General benefits are claimed 
in terms of both planning and implementations. Vith regard to 
the choice of process sequence the two aspects converge and 
interfere since the matching parts to machines (planning) is 
constrainted by machine availability (implementation). Wachine 
availability is, of course, determined by scheduling. The 
production schedule, in turn, governs raw materials requirements. 
The nature and difficulty of the optimization problem 
emerges more clearly from the consideration that two management 
objectives are clearly in conflict. On the one hand it is 
desirable to maximize the effective utilization of all capital 
equipment, especially the most expensive machines such as CBC 
milling centers.'" On the other hand, it is desirable to 
minimize the number and value of parts in the "work in progress" 
inventory. It is fairly obvious that machine utilization can be 
increased in general by using idle machines to build parts 
inventory. On the other hand, work-in-progress can be reduced 
essentially to zero, but only by having a large enough inventory 
of machines such that no part ever has to wait for a machine to 
become available. Since both machines and work-in-progress 
represent real capital, the true optimum (disregarding other 
constraints) is obviously some compromise between these extremes. 
Assuming the machines inventory is fixed (in the short term) the 
variable factor is the length of the queue of work-in-progress. 
A pure optimum solution would be characterized by at least one 
machine being 100% utilized--a "bottleneckw--while the rest are 
idle to variable degrees. 
The above problem can be solved in principle by integer- 
programming techniques, for a given machine inventory and product 
mix. The problem is far more difficult to solve if parts mix 
demand is variable and uncertain and machines can break down at 
random intervals. Nevertheless, existing mathematical 
-See, for example Burbridge C 19751 ; Devries et al. C 19761 ; 
Edwards C 19711 ; Gallagher & Knight 1 19731 ; Ham & Ross 1 19771 ; 
Mitrafanov, S. P. (in English 1 19661 > ; Opitz [ 19701 . 
'"But not by using an expensive machine for an operation 
that a cheaper one can perform just as well! 
programming and simulation techniques for planning, packaged as 
Hanufacturing Resource Planning (KRP) systems are now 
commercially available yielding significant improvements in 
overall capital utilization. Even so, the optimum capital 
utilization rate will tend to be fairly low in batch production 
situations where product diversity is high and production rates 
are comparatively low. 
Vith regard to the "amount" of information processing needed 
as a function of the complexity of products (1.e. the number of 
different parts in the filing system), it is difficult to state a 
general theorem. Experience suggests, however, that the number 
of distinct operations involved in sorting and matching items on 
a list (even by the most efficient method) increases as something 
like the square of the number of items on the list. From a 
purely combinatorial perspective, the number f (n) of number of 
possible scheduling schemes for n different parts, each of which 
can be made on mi different machines, at (1 = 1, . . .  n) different 
rates subject to various constraints, is almost beyond 
calculation when these numbers are large. At any rate, it is 
safe to assert that 
Selection of the optimum schedule from among these f(n) 
possibilities by any known mathematical programming technique 
involves a number of mathematical operations g(n) of the order of 
That is, the number of mathematical operations required to 
compare and select the most efficient schedule option is of the 
order of the square of the number of such options. This number, 
in turn, is much larger than the number of different parts to be 
made. 
Another illustration of the complexity-related combinatorlal 
explosion (and its implications) comes from the problem of 
assembly optimization. It has been shown [DeFazio & Whitney 833 
that, as the number of parts in the assembly increases, the 
numker of possible ways of assembling them -- "parts trees'' -- 
increases much faster than n, as shown in Table 1 and Figure 4. 
To be sure, many parts trees are physically unrealizable, but the 
only known method of optimization (to date) is to construct all 
possible parts trees and test them individually, for physical 
realizability by applying constraints such as contact and 
precedence conditions. 
6. Complexity Heasures and Computer-Aided Process Planning 
(CAPP) 
An attractive approach to computer-aided process planning is 
to select a discrete-part manufacturing process mainly in terms 
of four or five key product variables: the complexity of the 
product, the precision with which the product must be made, the 
lot or batch size, and the diversity, or number of models in the 
"family". The physical size or dimension of the item is also a 
relevant variable." Each of these variables affects the choice 
of manufactyuring method, since labor, capital and energy 
requirements differ among them. The greater the complexity of 
the product, in general, the greater the degree of automation 
required in the manufacturing process, to reduce the chances of 
machine operator error. The greater the precision required, 
again in general, the greater the degree of automation needed to 
reduce operator errors. The larger the lot or batch size (and 
the longer the expected life cycle), the less the degree of 
flexibility required in the manufacturing process and the 
equipment used. In fact, for a large enough manufacturing run, 
specially designed, single-purpose manufacturing machinery can be 
justified. On the other Hand, the greater the diversity of 
models, the more flexibility is needed. In particular, where a 
"family" of parts is to be produced in moderate to small batches 
over many years, an F13S will be indicated. 
Evidently, these four (or five) key product variables 
interact in a complex way. Experience demonstrates that the 
choice of manufacturing methods is not a simple one, even when 
the complexity of the product, the precision, the lot size and 
the product diversity are known. There are important advantages 
"This assumes that design and material choices are 
prespecif led. See, however, Ayres [ 198Sbl . 
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to be gained from incorporating empirical knowledge of 
manufacturing processes into an expert system, and making the 
system available to manufacturing engineers and managers. 
It is perfectly clear that the costs of inputs (factors of 
production) determine the ultimate cost of the product. It 
follows that the optimum choice of technology depends, in 
principle, on these factors. One would expect some differences, 
for instance, between a high-wage country and a low-wage country. 
However, it is also clear that among the developed countries wage 
and capital costs are converging and technological choice in 
manufacturing is less and less strongly motivated by the 
differnces that remain. 
Measures of precisions (tolerances) with which the product 
must be made, and lot size, are already familiar and easily- 
measured parameters to the manufacturing engineer and manager. 
However, a useful measure of product complexity has hitherto not 
been available. For complete assemblies one might, perhaps, use 
a surrogate measure such as the number of discrete parts. An 
example of this approach is illustrated in Figure 1. However, 
such a measure treats simple connectors and computer chips as if 
they were equivalent. In the mechanical sphere, there is a vast 
difference between the complexity (and cost) of "main parts" with 
many distinct surfaces vis a vis simpler ones. In actuality a 
small number of "main parts" account for half of all the value 
added in Manufacturing (Figure 5). Yet this is quite 
understandable in view of the fact that complex parts "embody" 
far more information than simple ones. In effect, information 
embodied in shapes is the logical measure of complexity. We 
propose to develop such a measure, since it is an important 
parameter in characterizing manufacturing processes. The 
complexity measure will be based on information theory, and will 
in effect measure the minimum number of bits of information 
needed to describe a part. 
To consider how this might be done, suppose parts are 
classified according to one of the standard GT systems. For 
example, in the Opitz 5-digit system a plain hexagonal machine 
nut would have the classification 30500. In this case the first 
digit implies a rotational part with deviation, L/D i 2; the 
second eigit implies hexagonal overall shtipe; the third digit 

implies a rotational internal shape with screw threads; the 
fourth digit implies flat (unstructured plane surfaces; and the 
fifth digit implies no auxiliary holes or gear teeth. The 
specification of a classification of this sort obviously reduces 
uncertainty about possible shapes and therefore has information 
content. (For our purposes a 5-digit system is probably ample.) 
Of course, not all 5-digit specifications are equally probable, 
but if they were (recalling that information is defined as the 
logarithm of the inverse probability of an event "coming true"), 
then the information content would be 
log2 (10") = 5 log2 10 
= 16 bits. 
Where a given classification is more probable than the 
average (as in the case of the hex nut) the information content 
of the specification would be somewhat less than 16 bits, and 
conversely, an improbably specificiation would have greater 
information value. Thus, for greater precision it would be 
necessary to estimate the a prior1 probabilities of each Opitz 
(or other) classification. This is, clearly, a task for 
empirical research. 
In addition to the purely geometrical classification, 
dimensional specifications add further information. For 
instance, specification of the internal screw threads in the net 
would require three parameters, including depth and width of 
groove, and pitch (or incline) of the thread. Also, the 
thickness of the nut L, the external diameter D, -- or the 
length of the one edge of the hexagon -- and the internal 
diameter d must be defined. Altogether, there are 6 independent 
parameters, each of which can be assumed to correspond to 10 bits 
of i n f ~ r m a t i o n , ~ ~  plus an additional bit of information to 
specify whether a screw is right or left-handed, or 61 bits 
total. 
An important consequence of the concept of using information 
theory to define the complexity of a product is that assembly is 
l2This assumes an accuracy of 1 part in 1000 or about 2"'. 
Note that log, 1000 ' 10. 
seen to be an information-destroying process. Two parts which 
are to be assembled into a larger product will have two or more 
mating surfaces, each surface requiring several parameters to 
specify it. W e n  they are assembled, however, the final assembly 
requires fewer parameters to describe it than did the unassembled 
pieces. In particular, information about the mating surfaces in 
the interior of the final assembly is destroyed during the 
assembly process. The use of information theory to define part 
complexity leads to a conclusion already known, namely that 
assembly is an expensive way of producing something. The fact 
that manufacturing engineers and managers choose other ways, 
whenever possible, encourages one to believe that information 
theory provides a fruitful way of defining product complexity. 
7. Nanufacturing Technology Decision Criteria 
One may suppose for purposes of discussion that the choice 
of manufacturing technology is made after the choice of design 
and materials is fixed. In reality, of course, the decision 
process is iterative, if not continuous. However, even an 
iterative decision process can be broken up conceptually into 
distinct steps, taken ceteris paribus. 
With this simplification the choice of technology will 
depend mainly on the four major variables previously identified: 
- complexity 
- precision 
- batch size/lot size/run length 
- diversity 
( A  fifth variable, mass or linear dimension, may be added for 
completeness). 
In principle, the cost of production must depend on these 
variables, for a given capital and labor cost environment. With 
voluminous and reliable cost data for many specific products, a 
general cost function might be constructed econometric ally:^^^^ 
However this has not been done, because it would be enormously 
' =A  number of more specialized models have been proposed in 
the U. S. , for example to minimize assembly cost C Boothroyd, 
19831, or to justify the use of flexible manufacturin~ systems 
[Gustavson, 19831, [Hutchinson, 19841 or to justify the use of 
robotic assembly C Funk, 1964, 19861 . 
expensive to gather the data even if firms were willing to 
release it. An indirect approach is therefore desirable. 
The four variables -- complexity, precision, lot size and 
diversity -- can be considered as defining a "manufacturing 
hypercube" in a properly chosen parameter space. In different 
regions in the interior of that hypercube, different 
manufacturing processes will generally be optimal. These regions 
will be separated by "switching surfaces", such that as one 
crosses a surface, the optimal manufacturing method switches from 
one process to another. In reality, of course, these surfaces 
may not be sharply defined. In principle, however, one can think 
of such switching surfaces as dividing the regions of the 
hypercube from one another. Each connected region in the 
interior of the hypercube will be divided from all other regions 
by a set of switching surfaces, and whithin a particular region, 
one would expect a specific manufacturing process to be optimal. 
Three "cuts" of the hypercube are illustrated in Figures 
6<a, b,c>. 
The switching surfaces which separate different regions of 
the manufacturing hypercube a w u n t  to iso-technology frontiers. 
They are the loci of points having different combinations of 
complexity, precision and lot size, but which are equivalent in 
that they represent the boundary between two regions. In other 
words, they are loci of points where the performance of two 
different manufacturing methods is equivalent and the choice 
between them is arbitrary. A s  already noted, the switching 
surfaces will not be sharply defined. There will, for example, 
be regional differences due to wage and capital cost 
differentials. Moreover, they will move, as technolgoy evolves. 
The choice of the proper manufacturing process becomes a 
multicriterion decision task, taking into account several 
chatacteristics of the product and the manufacturing processes, 
including such mundane considerations as the fact that in a 
multi-product environment the machinery for carrying out the 
"optimal" process may already be committed to some other higher- 
priority task. Thus multicriteria decision procedures will be 
necessary to aid in choosing the manufacturing process which is 
optimal, not in some abstract sense, but in the concrete 
circumstances facing the plant manager. 
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8. Complexity and YIanufacturlng: The I[onollthlc Concept 
Until the 1960's, complexity of any machine could reasonably 
be measured in terms of its 'parts count', the number of 
components from which it was made. The few exceptions (such as 
solid stamped or forged wheels replacing spoked bicycle-type 
wheels) essentially prove the generality of the rule. This was as 
true for electrical machines as for mechanical devices. In 1958, 
J. A. norton, Vice President of Bell Laboratories, wrote that 
scientists know in principle how to extend man's visual, tactile, 
and computational abilities by means of electronic circuitry, but 
that "such systems, because of their complex digital nature, 
require hundreds, thousands, and sometimes tens of thousands of 
electron  device^."'^ Worton called this the 'tyranny of 
numbers'. He pointed out that each electronic circuit element 
(resistor, capacitor, inductor, transistor, etc. "must be made, 
tested, packed, shipped, unpacked, retested, and interconnected 
one-at-a-time to produce a whole system". Morton said, "The 
tyranny of large numbers sets up a numbers barrier to future 
advances if we must rely on individual discrete components." 
Indeed, a circuit with 100,000 components could easily require 
1,000,000 different soldered connections. The Control Data 
Corporations CDC 1604 Computer (1959) had 25,000 transistors 
100,000 diodes, and hundreds of thousands of resistors and 
capacitors (ibid) . A navy destroyer at the time had 350,000 
district electronic components, with millions of soldered 
connect ions. 
This was the background for the monolithic revolution: the 
introduction of "integrated circuits" invented independently by 
J. Kilby of Texas Instruments Company, and Robert Hoyce of 
Fairchild Semiconductor (1958-1959,. Since then, waves of 
microminiaturization have compressed more and more circuit 
elements onto a single semiconductor chip. The latest 'chips' are 
almost unbelievable complex devices electronically, but the 
complexity is embodied in conipositional non-uninformities. A 
'chip' is built up of patterned layers of insulators, conductors 
'aQuotes cited by T. R. Reid in "The Chip" Science 85, 
February 1985, page 35. 
and semiconductors with carefully contrived properties. They are 
manufactured, incidently, by a kind of controlled "growth" 
process similar to the way a natural crystal grows: from the 
inside out. 
A similar trend in integration (to avoid the 'tyranny of 
numbers') is beginning to appear in the mechanical and 
electromechanical arena. For instance, early w6quirrel cage" 
induction motors, c. 1900, were assembled from a number of sheet- 
metal parts. Later, the number was sharply reduced by a new 
fabrication technique (centrifugal casting), which also cut the 
weight and permitted a much higher power/weight ratio. The 
modern stamped automobile wheel -- which replaced the earlier 
bicycle-type wheel assembled from many individual parts -- 
constitutes another case in point, For a third example, the 1953 
Garrett turbo-charger required 182 parts. The 1982 version 
weighs 88% less, delivers twice the speed and requires only 53 
parts [Aerospace 851. More recently, the IBW dot-matrix printer 
(introduced in 1985) involves only 68 parts, as compared to 150 
parts for comparable units built only two years earlier.16 Huch 
of IBW's reduction in parts number for the printer was achieved 
by using complex molded side frames to replace 20 other parts. 
Motors twist and lock into place, eliminating four bolts, four 
nuts, and four washers each. This greatly reduces the amount of 
assembly labor needed, as well as the probability of defects and 
need for inspection. Another recent example comes from Black & 
Decker Mfg. Co. , the world's leading producer of electric hand 
tools. A comprehensive redesign and simplification of the entire 
product line resulted in dramatic savings in manufacturing cost. 
One can scarcely escape the conclusion that the next 
generation of household appliances and automobiles will have many 
fewer mechanical parts than the present generation of such 
products. Just as integration of electronic circuitry involved 
"growing" complex chips by adding successive layers and materials 
with different properties, so the manufacture of integrated 
mechanical devices may proceed in the future. One can easily 
envision a 'monolithic' chair, for instance, having rigid legs, 
springy seat and back, foam cushions and a velour or leather-like 
1 . 5 . . ~ ~ l ~  St . Journal, April 13, 1986. 
surface, entirely mnnufactured by adding successive layers to a 
molded substrate in a controlled fashion without any cutting or 
assembly of pieces. If chairs, then why not desks, tables, sofas, 
and beds? Woving parts introduce difficulties, but not 
necessarily insuperable ones. Ultimately, the number of 'parts' 
in a car might well drop into the low hundreds, as complex body 
and f r a ~  subassemblies are replaced by monolithic molded 
substitutes. Henry Ford considered his major contribution to 
manufacturing to be the .elimination of wfitters". The next major 
revolution in manufacturing may be the (gradual) elimination of 
assembly itself. 
To be sure, the manufacturing of monolithic ~ c h a n i c a l  
products analogous to the 'chip' would likely entail very complex 
multi-stage processes -- just as chip-making does. But 
increasingly sophisticated and predictable counter-pressure 
casting/molding techniques and isostatic powder metallurgical 
techniques are beginning to find wider uses. Extensive 
pretesting can reduce intrinsic defect rates to almost 
arbitrarily low levels. A flaw once detected in the 
manufacturing system itself is eliminated once-for-all. 
Downstream inspection will largely be done by computer-assisted 
microscopy and thermography. A final bit of speculation: man will 
not fully conquer space until monolithic construction techniques 
are adopted for space-ships. Until then, operational reliability 
will remain an elusive dream. 
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